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NOTE
New Diagnoses and the ADA: A Case Study of
Fibromyalgia and Multiple Chemical Sensitivity
Ruby Afram*
INTRODUCTION
From its inception in 1990, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
has been a groundbreaking piece of civil rights legislation: a highly
flexible, individually responsive law that intended to bring "some
43,000,000" disabled Americans into society's mainstream.' To ensure the
envisioned access and opportunity, the ADA sought to replicate for people
with disabilities the type of protections that the Civil Rights Act of 1964
provided to women and minorities.2 It barred discrimination on the basis
of disability in employment 3 and required that all public entities4 and
public accommodations provided by private entities5 be accessible to the
disabled population. The law was controversial, however, because it
differed in an important way from traditional civil rights legislation.6 The
civil rights movement had articulated a fundamental imperative:
"[D]iscrimination according to characteristics irrelevant to job
* J.D. candidate, Yale Law School.
1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000)). For the reference to "some 43,000,000," see
id. § 12101.
2. JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 105 (1993).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2000).
4. Id. § 12132.
5. Id. § 12182. For definitions of covered entities, see id. § 12181 (2000).
6. SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 115.
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performance and the denial of access to public accommodations and
public services was... against the law."7 When that imperative played out
in the course of everyday life it resulted in businesses opening their doors
and their organizations to a wider swath of society. Generally, however, it
did not require them to change the way they did business, just whom they
included-in economic terms, a relatively inexpensive adjustment. In
comparison, the ADA was invasive -legislation; it imposed affirmative duties
on companies to adjust the way they did business in order to accommodate
the special needs of their employees and clients.8 Even though the law
limited the burden on employers by requiring that they make
modifications for employees and clients only when the adjustments were
easy to achieve and of reasonable expense, the ADA imposed new costs on
all entities required to comply with its mandates.
7. NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY THE MAKING OF THE
AMERICANS VITH DISABILITIES ACT (1997),
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/pdf/equality.pdf.
8. SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 115.
9. Id. Title I of the ADA covers employment: "The term 'employer' means a person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each
working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar
year, and any agent of such person ...." 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (5) (A) (2000). Title II of the
ADA covers public services provided by a public entity: "(1) Public entity. The term 'public
entity' means-(A) any State or local government; (B) any department, agency, special
purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government; and
(C) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority .. " 42
U.S.C. § 12131(1) (2000).
Title III of the ADA covers public accommodations provided by private entities:
(7) Public accommodation. The following private entities are considered public
accommodations for purposes of this title [42 USCS §§ 12181 et seq.], if the
operations of such entities affect commerce-
(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging...;
(B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink;
(C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of
exhibition or entertainment;
(D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public
gathering;
(E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or
other sales or rental establishment;
(F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service,
shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer,
pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital,
or other service establishment;
(G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public transportation;
(H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or collection;
(1) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation;
IV:I1 (2004)
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The affirmative duties that differentiate the ADA from other civil
rights legislation have, in the years since its passage, made it the target of a
backlash.'0 Different groups have sought to cabin the ADA's impact, and
one major limitation has come from the courts. In two important ADA
cases, Sutton v. United Airlines" and Toyota v. Williams, 2 the United States
Supreme Court latched onto the figure "43,000,000" as a way to justify a
restrictive interpretation of the law's provisions, making the figure an
effective ceiling on the number of disabled Americans protected by the
law. The history of the ADA, however, makes it clear that "43,000,000" was
never intended to be a ceiling; it was intended to convey the enormity of
the problem that the ADA addressed. 3 Congress clearly foresaw that the
(J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private
school, or other place of education;
(K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank,
adoption agency, or other social service center establishment; and
(L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of
exercise or recreation.
42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2000).
10. See, e.g., Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21
BERKELEYJ. EMp. & LAB. L. 19, 20-23 (2000) (discussing ADA advocates' "horror" at how case
law under the ADA has developed and seeking to explain these "negative" outcomes); Chai
R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened?
Why? And What Can WeDo About It?, 21 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 91 (2000) (reviewing the
limitations that courts have imposed on the ADA by using its definitional language to set
high and complex barriers to litigation); Cary Lacheen, Achy Breaky Pelvis, Lumber Lung and
Juggler's Despair: The Portrayal of the Americans with Disabilities Act on Television and Radio, 21
BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 223, 233 (2000) (discussing the negative portrayal of the ADA in
popular culture media).
11. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (stating that Congress did not
intend to provide coverage in the ADA for persons whose conditions could be alleviated by
corrective measures such that their impairment did not substantially limit a major life
activity).Justice O'Connor's majority opinion limited ADA suits to those whose corrected
condition still "substantially limited a major life activity." Id. at 482.
12. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002) (holding "that to
be substantially limited in performing manual tasks [under the ADA], an individual must
have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities
that are of central importance to most people's daily lives" and that "[t] he impairment's
impact must also be permanent or long-term"). Justice O'Connor, again writing for the
majority, stated: "If Congress intended everyone with a physical impairment that precluded
the performance of some isolated, unimportant, or particularly difficult manual task to
qualify as disabled, the number of disabled Americans would surely have been much
higher." Id. at 197.
13. See Steny H. Hoyer, Not Exactly What We Intended, Justice O'Connor, WASH. POST,
3
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aging of the Baby Boomers would result in an increased number of
Americans being protected by the law in the years following its passage. 4 A
desire to make the law highly flexible and inclusive informed the Act's
legislative history. Congress chose expansive language and a broad
definition of disability.15 Professor Kevin Smith has written, "Given the wide
variety of physical and mental conditions which can adversely affect an
individual's ability to perform a major life activity... Congress neither
defined what constitutes a physical or mental impairment nor listed the
universe of possible impairments."'
6
This built-in flexibility initially allowed two possible avenues of growth
for the ADA, distinct from the growth in the elderly population. The first
was a flexible and generous interpretation of the law's provisions that
might have provided protection under the ADA to more than the forty-
three million Americans estimated by Congress. The Supreme Court
clearly rejected this possibility in both Toyota and Sutton, binding itself
instead to an inflexible and restrictive understanding of the law. The
January 20, 2002, at BI (discussing the ADA after Toyota). Congressman Hoyer wrote:
When we wrote the ADA, we estimated that 43 million people would be
covered. That seemed like a lot and we thought that showed we intended the law
to be broad rather than narrow. Until the ADA passed, the average guy thought
of a disability as something that meant you couldn't walk or see or hear. Our
broader estimate helped build support for the legislation.
Now, however, O'Connor has cited that figure to say that carpal tunnel and
other conditions might push the national total of people protected under the
ADA far beyond 43 million and that Congress did not intend that. "If Congress
intended everyone with a physical impairment that precluded the performance of
some isolated, unimportant, or particularly difficult manual task to qualify as
disabled, the number of disabled Americans would surely have been much
higher," she wrote. But the number we used wasn't designed to limit the effect of
our legislation, but to show its breadth.
Id.
14. The Congressional "findings and purposes" noted that "some 43,000,000 Americans
have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the
population as a whole is growing older." 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000).
15. See Feldblum, supra note 10, at 125-34 (discussing the legislative history of the
adoption of the definition of disability in the ADA).
16. Kevin H. Smith, Disabilities, Law Schools, and Law Students: A Proactive and Holistic
Approach, 32 Akron L. Rev. 1 (1999). Smith quotes the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) regulations for the ADA, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630 (1998):
"'[T] he ADA... [does] not attempt a "laundry list" of impairments that are "disabilities."
The determination of whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily based on the
name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of that
impairment on the life of the individual."' Id. at 42 n.1 18.
IV:I1 (2004)
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second possibility-the development and recognition of new illnesses and
new diagnoses covered by the ADA-existed outside of the framework of
the law; because the ADA did not include an exhaustive list of qualified
conditions, it also did not attempt to identify a process by which new
disabilities might be recognized under the law.
Given the structure of the law, recognition of new conditions need not
be problematic for the ADA. The law offers highly-individualized
protection, and citizens seeking that protection do not have to prove that
they have a particular condition. 7 Instead, in order for a plaintiff to sue,
courts have required that she first show that she is a person with a
disability, as defined by the ADA. The status of a plaintiff claiming a
current disability depends on three key factors: She must (1) have an
impairment that (2) "substantially limits" her in (3) a "major life activity."
Agencies responsible for enforcing various titles of the ADA have issued
regulations attempting to clarify the meaning of these phrases. Like the
language of the statute, the regulations are broadly inclusive of the
conditions covered. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is
responsible for issuing the regulations interpreting Title I, and it uses
sweeping language to define a physical or mental impairment as "any
physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss ... or... any mental or psychological disorder.""' The
Department of Justice regulations for Titles II and III of the ADA closely
17. This differs from the two disability benefits programs run by the Social Security
Administration-the Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI) and the Federal Old-
Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Program (OASDI)-for which there is a list of
covered conditions, as well as an alternate process for demonstrating that a condition that is
not listed is similar in nature to those on the list. 20 C.F.R. § 404, subpt. P, app. 1 (2003).
The basic requirement for either program is that in order to receive benefits, the claimant
must be legally disabled under a five-step claim and benefit determination process. Aimee
E. Bierman, Note, The Medico-Legal Enigma of Fibromyalgia: Social-Security Disability
Determinations and Subjective Complaints of Pain, 44 WAYNE L. REv. 259, 267-69 (1998).
18. The regulation states:
(h) Physical or mental impairment means:
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech
organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and
lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic
brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2003).
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track this language.'9 Presumably, a person with a new condition that met
these requirements, though it was not known or recognized at the time of
the ADA's passage, would be entitled to protection under the law.
Obtaining coverage under the ADA, however, has proven no mean
feat, even for plaintiffs with traditionally recognized conditions. ° Phrases
that seem straightforward have generated a large body of complex case
law. Definitional challenges involving the requirements or meaning of
each key phrase are often put forth by defendants and adopted by the
courts. These challenges have restricted access to the ADA's protections,21
19. The regulation states:
(1) (i) The phrase physical or mental impairment means-
(A) Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
Neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including
speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, hemic and
lymphatic, skin, and endocrine;
(B) Any mental or psychological disorder such as mental retardation, organic
brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
(ii) The phrase physical or mental impairment includes, but is not limited to,
such contagious and noncontagious diseases and conditions as orthopedic, visual,
speech and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy,
multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional
illness, specific learning disabilities, HIV disease (whether symptomatic or
asymptomatic), tuberculosis, drug addiction, and alcoholism.
(iii) The phrase physical or mental impairment does not include homosexuality
or bisexuality.
28 C.F.R. § 35.104(1) (2003).
20. See, e.g., Susan M. Gibson, The Americans with Disabilities Act Protects Individuals with a
History of Cancer from Employment Discrimination: Myth or Reality, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
167 (1998); Barbara Hoffman, Between a Disability and a Hard Place: The Cancer Survivors'
Catch-22 of Proving Disability Status Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 59 MD. L. REv. 352
(2000).
21. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) (holding "that to
be substantially limited in performing manual tasks [under the ADA], an individual must
have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities
that are of central importance to most people's daily lives" and that "[t] he impairment's
impact must also be permanent or long-term"); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S.
555, 565 (1999) (noting that "mitigating measures must be taken into account in judging
whether an individual possesses a disability"); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471
(1999) (holding that a "disability" under the ADA has to be determined with regard to the
corrective measures that are available); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (holding
that HIV is a disability under the ADA). The language "qualified individual with a disability"
was first interpreted by the Supreme Court in a case arising under section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Southeastern Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979). The
language relating "qualified individual" to "essential functions" of the job in the Title I
IV: 1 (2004)
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creating high barriers to success for plaintiffs.2 2 Suits by plaintiffs with new
conditions have been especially tricky; defendants have attempted to
enhance the pattern of definitional restriction by attacking ADA claims
made by plaintiffs with recently discovered illnesses. Plaintiffs bringing
claims under novel or fresh diagnoses have been greeted by charges from
defendants that their claims are based on invalid or unrecognized medical
conditions.
As the number of people with known conditions has grown in the
years since the passage of the ADA so, too, has the number of recognized
23disabling conditions. No formal barrier keeps the law from expanding to
cover new disabling conditions as they are discovered. The important
question, then, is how new diagnoses have actually been treated in ADA
litigation in the years since the law's passage. Focusing on ADA Title I
litigation, this Note studies the treatment of two "new" diagnoses that have
actually been challenged by defendants in ADA lawsuits: fibromyalgia and
multiple chemical sensitivity (MCS).24 Both diagnoses were initially highly
controversial, but have gained wider acceptance within the medical
community in the thirteen years since the passage of the ADA.
Nonetheless, neither is without its skeptics. There are parallels between the
two illnesses: both lack a known etiology; both occur much more
frequently in women than in men; and, unlike most "established"
conditions, neither has a generally accepted, "objective" medical test that
allow for its diagnosis. Yet ADA suits centered on the two diagnoses have
met somewhat different fates in the federal courts. Neither has received a
definitions appeared in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
22. See Feldblum, supra note 10, at 139. Feldblum reports that:
[T] he editors of the National Disability Law Reporter... found that, in 110 ADA
cases in 1995 and 1996, the question had been raised as to whether the plaintiff
met the statutory definition of disability under the ADA.... [I] n only six of those
cases had the judges definitively found the plaintiffs met the statutory definition.
Id. at 139.
23. See, e.g.,Jane E. Brody, The Road to Wellness, Paved With 1,900 Pages, N.Y. TIMES,June
3, 2003, at F7 (discussing the addition of new conditions in the newest edition of Merck
Manual and stating "[t] he new version adds 35 chapters and 400 pages.... Under 'Diseases
of Unknown Cause,' conditions like chronic fatigue syndrome and multiple chemical
sensitivity syndrome are described dispassionately along with honest assessments of
treatments that have or have not worked"); Six Years Later .. ,WASH. POST, May 20, 2003, at
F02 (discussing changes to the Merck Manual of Medical Information, including the
inclusion of new conditions like "Gulf War syndrome, multiple chemical sensitivity, chronic
fatigue syndrome, [and] sick building syndrome").
24. MCS is also known as "multiple chemical sensitivities."
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warm welcome, but while courts have generally accepted a diagnosis of
fibromyalgia, MCS has had been subjected to significant exclusion-most
importantly through the use of the Daubert standard for expert testimony
and evidence, established by the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.25 Because ADA litigation is often so fact-specific, every
piece of information about an employee's condition may be vital to the
outcome of the case. Defendants have exploited this by using Daubert,
originally established in the field of mass tort litigation, to effectively
exclude expert testimony about MCS. Without such testimony, some
plaintiffs lack evidence crucial to proving components of their
discrimination claim. As a result, new conditions such as MCS are left out
in the cold.
In attempting to understand why the two illnesses have met with
different receptions, and what it means for the inclusion of new diagnoses
under the ADA, Part I of this Note provides an overview and history of
fibromyalgia; Part II does the same for multiple chemical sensitivity. Parts I
and II are designed to give a sense of the complex debates that have
surrounded the emergence of the two diagnoses and to provide a basic
medical framework for the Note's later legal analysis. Part III surveys the
case law that has developed around the two illnesses, analyzing significant
trends and comparing results under the two illnesses with general statistics
25. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). In fact, a significant
body of literature has developed concerning the ADA and MCS. Several other
commentators have previously observed, as I do in this Note, that the use of the Daubert
standard to exclude expert testimony makes it exceedingly difficult for individuals suffering
from MCS to bring successful ADA claims. See, e.g., Peter David Blanck & Heidi M. Berven,
Evidence of Disability After Daubert, 5 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & L. 16 (1999) ("The few federal
courts that have applied the Daubert formulation to expert testimony relating to MCS have
found clinical ecology evidence inadmissible .... ); Andrew K. Kelley, Sensitivity Training:
Multiple Chemical Sensitivity and the ADA, 25 B.C. ENVTL. Arr. L. REv. 485,496 (1998) (noting
that "courts have refused to allow expert testimony regarding MCS because it lacks scientific
reliability, thereby failing to meet the standards for expert opinion testimony established by
the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc." and that "MCS sufferers
who have brought [ADA] claims have had very limited success" ); Amy B. Spagnole, The
MCS Controversy: Admissibility of Expert Testimony Regarding Multiple Chemical Sensitivity
Syndrome Under the Daubert Regime, 4 SUFFOLKJ. TRIAL & APP. ADv. 219, 234 (1999) ("In
applying the Daubert standard to MCS litigation, every federal court, which has ruled on the
issue of admissibility of expert testimony regarding MCS, has found the proferred testimony
inadmissible."). This Note differs from these earlier studies by comparing the relative
successes of MCS and fibromylagia sufferers under the ADA and by offering a new
resolution to this problem. See infra Part IV.
IV:l1 (2004)
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on lawsuits brought under Title I of the ADA. Part IV attempts to explain
why the two illnesses have fared differently in the courts, focusing on the
role of the Daubert standard and its possible implications for the fate of new
diagnoses in ADA litigation. Part V argues that using Daubert to bar
plaintiffs' claims is entirely inappropriate in the civil rights context and
that it frustrates the ADA's inclusive intent. However, because of current
trends in the law, it may be necessary for the courts to reconcile the
seemingly contradictory directives of the Daubert exclusion and its progeny
case law with the ADA's inclusiveness. Drawing on current case law, this
Note then suggests a resolution that will allow the ADA to expand and
encompass citizens whose conditions were unknown or widely unaccepted
at the time of the law's passage.
I. FIBROMYALGA-AN OVERVIEW
Fibromyalgia is a common musculoskeletal syndrome characterized by
generalized pain, irregular sleep patterns, fatigue, and a wide range of
secondary symptoms. 26 A diagnosis of fibromyalgia requires pain in at least
eleven of eighteen specific sites on the body. Pain caused by the condition
can be severe or limited; it may be continual or occur in flares, with
periods of remission. The condition affects between three and six million
Americans, 7 and occurs most commonly in women between the ages of
twenty and fifty.2 8 Women are ten times more likely than men to be
diagnosed with fibromyalgia. There is no single treatment that works well
for all patients, or even for a large majority,2 9 and the cause of the illness
remains unknown. Questions about fibromyalgia's existence as a clinical
entity have dominated its history and continue to appear in modern
26. Daniel H. Reiffenberger & Loren H. Amundson, Fibromyalgia Syndrome: A Review, 53
Am. FAm. PI-wSicLAN 1698 (1996). Fibromyalgia has been defined as causing "'widespread
and chronic musculoskeletal aching or stiffness associated with soft tissue tenderness at
multiple, characteristic sites.'" Id. at 1698 (quoting Muhammad B. Yunus, Fibromyalgia
Syndrome: New Research on an Old Malady, 298 BRIT. MED.J. 474 (1989)).
27. Robert W. Bradford & Henry W. Allen, Recent Progress in Clinical Applications and
Research in Fibromyalgia: Part , TOWNSEND LETrER FOR DocToRs & PATIENTS, Nov. 1, 2001, at
28 [hereinafter Bradford & Allen, Part 1].
28. Linda C. Higgins, Proposed Fibromyalgia Guide May Help Doctors Pin Down a Puzzler,
MED. WORLD NEWS, June 12, 1989, at 10.
29. See Robert W. Bradford & Henry W. Allen, Recent Progress in Clinical Applications and
Research in Fibromyalgia: Part I, TOWNSEND LETrER FOR DOcTORs & PATIENTs,Jan. 1, 2002, at
74 [hereinafter Bradford & Allen, Part II1].
9
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coverage of the condition. 0
Fibromyalgia is not a new condition. There are anecdotes of similar
illnesses that date back to the seventeenth century.3' For generations,
however, physicians thought that the disabling illness was, quite literally, all
in the patient's head. For most of its known history, those who studied the
condition believed its genesis to be psychosomatic.3 2 The terms fibrositis
and fibromyositis became popular when it was believed that inflammation
in the connective tissues between muscles and bone was responsible for the
pain the condition caused.33 The term "fibromyalgia" did not exist until
1976. 34
Early efforts to understand the illness focused on identifying and
describing any standard symptoms or indicators of the disease. The onset
of fibromyalgia brought with it few physiological changes that could be
detected with standard medical tests.1 5 The illness's high level of
correlation with depression reinforced physicians' assumptions that they
were dealing with a psychosomatic illness. Later studies showed that "the
majority of people with fibromyalgia do not experience abnormal levels of
depression or anxiety.
' 6
The idea that fibromyalgia existed entirely within the patient's head,
however, continued to haunt the medical community, the popular press,
and those unfortunate enough to suffer from the debilitating illness. In the
early 1980s, research on fibromyalgia was still limited; 37 by the late-1980s,
however, it had experienced significant growth. In 1988, a small study
released by a group of Pennsylvania physicians showed that patients with
fibromyalgia demonstrated abnormal muscle metabolism function
dissimilar to that of a control group. According to Dr. Robert Gatter, Chief
of Rheumatology at Abington Memorial Hospital, it was "the first
30. See infra notes 40-62 and accompanying text.
31. DanielJ. Clauw, Fibromyalgia: More Than Just a Musculoskeletal Disease, 52 AM. FAM.
PuysiciAN 843 (1995) [hereinafter Clauw, Musculoskeletal].
32. Charles D. Bankhead, Fibromyalgia May Really Be in the Muscle, Not in the Mind, MED.
WORLD NEWS, Sept. 12, 1988, at 34.
33. See MirindaJ. Kossoff, 'I Hurt All Over" (Chronic Pain Condition Fibromyalgia), PSYCH.
TODAY, May 1999, at 42, 42.
34. See Clauw, Musculoskeletal supra note 31, at 843.
35. Linda Klein, Fibromyalgia Syndrome: Shedding Light on the "Mystery Disease", ARTHRITIS
TODAY, May 1989, at 50.
36. MelissaJames, Fibromyalgia Research: Growing by Leaps and Bounds, ARTHRITIS TODAY,
May 1989, at 54, 54.
37. Id. at 54.
IV:l1 (2004)
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semblance of something measurable that's abnormal in these patients.""
Other contemporary studies linked fibromyalgia to "[a]bnormal levels of
neurotransmitters" and mild alterations in the operation of the immune
system.3 9
Despite these initial findings, and estimates that twenty percent of all
rheumatology referrals were for fibromyalgia, the diagnosis still met with a
high level of skepticism. 4 0 Patients applying for disability benefits were
often rejected because, despite debilitating muscle tenderness, they lacked
any sort of objective evidence of their condition.41 In an attempt to remedy
this problem and to standardize diagnoses of fibromyalgia, in 1989 the
Multi-Center Fibromyalgia Criteria Study released the first version of the
modern diagnostic criteria for fibromyalgia, requiring "[t]enderness in at
least 11 of 18 specified sites on the body, accompanied by widespread
pain."42 Such symptoms differentiated the condition from other regional
38. Bankhead, supra note 32, at 34. Bankhead writes, "Using phosphorus magnetic
resonance spectroscopy, Pennsylvania physicians found that nine fibromyalgia patients had
one or more metabolic abnormalities, which were not seen in 22 controls, according to a
report at the American Rheumatism Association meeting." Id. Bankhead also notes that the
previous year Don Goldenberg and associates at Boston University released a similar study
in the Journal of the American Medical Association in which they looked at biopsies of trapezius
muscles in control and affected patients. Id.
39. James, supra note 36, at 54.
40. Bankhead, supra note 32, at 34 (quoting Dr. Tom Bohr of Stanford Medical Center
as stating "It's not simply contemporary medical prejudices that keep many physicians from
using the diagnosis of fibromyalgia. There simply never has been good evidence for it as a
syndrome distinct from affective disorders.").
41. Id.
42. Higgins, supra note 28, at 10. Higgins further wrote:
Investigators at 16 university and private-practice arthritis or pain clinics
evaluated a total of 293 patients with fibromyalgia and 265 control patients
matched for age and sex. The control patients had common regional pain
disorders that could be easily confused with fibromyalgia - possible inflammatory
arthritis, mild osteoarthritis, shoulder pain syndromes, and neck and back pain
syndromes.
After experts diagnosed patients' conditions by their usual standards, specially
trained investigators who had no knowledge of the diagnoses interviewed the
patients. Their evaluations included more than 300 variables. They also
performed tender point examinations at 30 sites and dolorimetry at nine sites.
... The most useful measures turned out to be a minimum of 11 out of a
possible 18 tender points, as well as skeletal pain in at least three regions: left-and
right-sided plus upper or lower quadrant. About 70% of the controls and 98% of
the fibromyalgia patients had widespread pain.
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pain disorders with which its- symptoms often overlapped; patients with
conditions other than fibromyalgia had significantly fewer tender points
and experienced much lower levels of pain when those points were
palpated.43 Using this system, doctors were able to differentiate patients
suffering from fibromyalgia from patients afflicted by other pain-related
conditions, like arthritis, at a rate of almost ninety percent."
The presence of discrete, sensitive areas (pressure points) on the
body-often unknown to a patient until palpated by their doctor-was not
a new finding. It was already considered to be the best way to diagnose
fibromyalgia. The Multi-Center Fibromyalgia Criteria Study, however, was
the first time investigators had agreed on the exact number and location of
tender points and the accompanying symptoms; every North American
physician who had contributed significantly to fibromyalgia research
received an invitation to participate. Previously, physicians used different
ratios to diagnose fibromyalgia, varying from four out of forty tender
points up to twelve of fourteen points. The study results, presented that
same year to the American College of Rheumatology ("ACR") ,* supported
the use of the eighteen-point-system for diagnosing fibromyalgia. The
ACR's acceptance of the system gave new legitimacy to what had been
viewed previously as a "waste basket" diagnosis46--one that was offered
when every other possibility had been discarded. Vigorous debate about
the condition continued.47
One major concern of the medical community was-and
continues to be-lack of objective physical evidence of the condition.48
Higgins, supra note 28, at 11.
43. Id. at 10.
44. PeterJaret, 18 Points of Pain: Closing in on Barely Noticeable Tender Spots May Illuminate
the Mystery of Fibromyalgia, HEALTH, July/Aug. 1990, at 62, 64.
45. Higgins, supra note 28, at 10.
46. For recognition of the fact that some may consider fibromyalgia to be a "'waste-
basket' diagnosis," see Paul Davidson, Fibromyalgia: A Painful and Treatable Illness, at
http://www.sfms.org/sfm/sfm202b.htm.
47. Jaret, supra note 44, at 62, 64.
48. Daniel Clauw, an expert on the illness, notes that it is not clear why fibromyalgia has
been singled out for this treatment:
Unfortunately, not all health care professionals... want to diagnose and manage
fibromyalgia. However approximately 40 percent of patients seen in the primary
care setting have symptoms with no identifiable cause, and most practitioners are
comfortable making and managing other symptom-based diagnoses such as
migraine and tension headache, irritable bowel symdrome and dysmenorrhea.
DanielJ. Clauw, Treating Fibromyalgia: Science vs. Art, 62 AM. FAM. PHYSIcIAN 1492 (2000)
IV:l1 (2004)
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Mary Dunkin has noted, "Unlike inflammatory forms of arthritis, which
can be verified through blood tests, and degenerative arthritis, which can
be confirmed by X-rays, fibromyalgia produces no obvious [or consistent
biological indicator] signs."4' Patients have been linked to a variety of
abnormalities. 50 To date, fibromyalgia is an illness of no known etiology; in
other words, it has no determinable cause. There are theories, but nothing
certain.5 ' The current definition of fibromyalgia groups patients by the
symptoms they manifest; a diagnosis in this form does not preclude the
possibility that different patients with the same symptoms are actually
suffering from distinct conditions)2 Patients diagnosed with fibromyalgia
have responded to a wide range of treatments, and within the studies of
the individual treatments, patients have had a wide range of responses;
everything from antidepressants to acupuncture has provided various
degrees of relief.53 This may in part explain why, though fibromyalgia has
become a widely recognized, studied, and diagnosed condition over the
past decade, the search for its cause and its cure(s) continues to frustrate
the medical community.
The uncertainty about fibromyalgia in the medical community has
carried over into the coverage of the illness in the popular press. The early
coverage of the condition gave it labels like "the mystery disease." The
stories often reported on the skepticism of the medical community. 4 One
article referred to it as "the Rodney Dangerfield of diseases," noting that
despite the high number of people it affected, fibromyalgia typically "gets
[hereinafter Clauw, Science vs. Art].
49. Mary Anne Dunkin, Fibromyalgia: Out of the Closet, ARTHRITIS TODAY, Sept. 1993, at 24.
50. These include abnormalities in neuroendocrine performance, central neuropeptide
levels, and functional brain activity. Bradford & Allen, Part I, supra note 27. For a brief, but
comprehensive overview of current studies about the causes and manifestations of
fibromyalgia, see id.; and Bradford & Allen, Part III, supra note 29.
51. "The very existence of fibromyalgia as a distinct clinical entity has been questioned,
partly because ... [of] the absence of a clearly defined mechanism by which to define the
disease." Bradford & Allen, Part I, supra note 27, at 28. Put in slightly different terms: there
is neither a recognizable, measurable cause nor an effect that consistently occurs with the
condition.
52. See Clauw, Science vs. Art, supra note 48, at 1492 (discussing ways in which
fibromyalgia may be related to similar conditions or overlap with them and considering
what can be gained in treatment by recognizing the connection between certain
conditions).
53. Allen and Bradford, Part III, supra note 29.
54. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 35; Elizabeth Pennisi, 'Mystery Pain'May Defy Diagnosis, But
It's All Too Real, Researchers Find, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 7, 1985, at C2.
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no respect.', 5 As more information about fibromyalgia became widely
available, the press shifted its emphasis from the mysterious nature of the
disease to the realities of living with it,56 but the stories still emphasized
how hard the illness was to diagnose and treat.57 One article pointed out
that the severity of the illness could cause sufferers to make substantial life
changes, including "quitting work, changing jobs or working part time.
5 8
Articles detailed the chronic and severe pain the condition can cause, and
how severely it can limit day-to-day activity, focusing on the stories of
individual women to illustrate the point.59 As the condition gained
acceptance as a medical diagnosis with widespread impact, coverage about
it included articles conveying everyday methods of coping with
fibromyalgia to the general public. 60 Reports extended from television and
print coverage to Internet sites, with fibromyalgia support groups forming
all across the country.61 As with work in the medical community, however,
even the more recent popular coverage about fibromyalgia reflects some
level of continuing skepticism about the condition-especially about its
62cause.
II. MULTIPLE CHEMICAL SENSITIVITY-AN OVERVIEW
Multiple chemical sensitivity is another condition that has received
increased exposure in the medical community and popular press during
the years since the passage of the ADA.63 Like fibromyalgia, it is a
55. Rob Bogin, Puzzling Illness a Pain to Diagnose, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Dec. 17,1995,
at 72A.
56. See, e.g., Ann Hardie, When Life Becomes One Big Pain: Fibromyalgia Can Be Physical,
Mental Drain, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Aug. 23, 1994, at B6.
57. See, e.g., Karen Garloch, Woman Finds Support for Baffling Disease - on Internet, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Dec. 21, 1997, at 18A; Karen Miller Medzon, Test Makes Painful Discovery -
Debilitating Fibromyalgia Hard to Detect, BOSTON HERALD, June 27, 1999 at 41; Leslie Sowers,
Where Don't You Hurt?; Fibromyalgia Remains a Mystery Ailment, but the Pain Is No Less Rea4
HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 21, 1996, at 1.
58. Hardie, supra note 56, at 6.
59. See, e.g., Joanne Kabak, Awareness of Fibromyalgia Needs to Be Much Improved, NEWSDAY,
Sept. 14, 1999, at C04.
60. See, e.g., Linda Buch, Strength Training May Ease Fibromyalgia, THE DENVER POST, Feb.
16, 2003, at L-05.
61. Jerome Groopman, HurtingAll Over: With So Many People in So Much Pain, How Could
Fibromyalgia Not Be a Disease?, THE NEWYORKER, Nov. 13, 2000, at 78.
62. See, e.g.,Jane E. Brody, Real Illness, RealAnswers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2000, at F8.
(noting "'is it a real disease?' is the most frequently asked question about fibromyalgia").
63. One article from 1993 notes, "Unless you've been on a desert island, you have
IV:I1 (2004)
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"syndrome of symptoms, '' 64 and its cause is unknown. Women comprise
eighty-five to ninety percent of MCS patients; symptoms most commonly
develop between the ages of thirty and fifty.6 5 No standard test explains
what triggers the symptoms of MCS, but symptoms commonly begin
following "a single heavy exposure to a substance, with recurrences
triggered by lower levels of the same substance or seemingly innocent or
related substances, such as odors or fragrances ,66 Frequently cited triggers
of the condition are "pesticides, solvents, paints and lacquers, and
formaldehyde, but can include virtually anything from anaesthetics to
exhaust fumes., 67 One thing on which the medical community agrees is
that "MCS is not a standard allergic reaction, as it does not involve
immunoglobulin and the release of histamine and other chemicals
associated with allergies."
The modern history of MCSO' began in the 1950s with Theron
Randolph, a Chicago physician. In 1962, Randolph released a book
probably heard of [MCS] ." Howard M. Sandier, Multiple Chemical Sensitivity: Myth or Reality ?,
OccuPATIoNAL HAZTARDS, Apr. 1993, at 53. Mike Monroe, a character on the television show
Northern Exposure, supposedly suffered from MCS, "forc[ing] him to live in a geodesic dome,
where he wears white gloves, and breathes filtered air." Charlotte Sutton, Is This Illness
Symptomatic of the Times?, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 6, 1993, at IA.
64. Thomas L. Kurt, Multiple Chemical Sensitivities - A Syndrome of Pseudotoxicity Manifest
As Exposure Perceived Symptoms, JOURNAL OF TOXICOLOGY: CLINICAL ToxiCOLOGY, Mar. 1995, at
101.
65. Michael K. Magill & Anthony Suruda, Multiple Chemical Sensitivity Syndrome, 58 AM.
FAM. PHYsjciAN 721 (1998).
66. Kurt, supra note 64, at 101; see also Tim Chapman, Suffering From a Sensitive Issue, 15
CHEMISTRY & INDUSTRY 592, 592 (1998) (quoting a 1995 European Commission report
describing MCS as "'sensitivity which begins as specific hypersensitivity to a single agent, or
class of substances, but which may evolve into non-specific hyper-responsiveness"' and
noting that "[s]ymptoms do not disappear when the agent is removed, and sensitivities may
also spread to other substances"). This differed from an American report released a few
years later. See infra text accompanying note 95.
67. Chapman, supra note 66, at 592.
68. Id. In his relatively early article on the topic, Howard Sandler argued that the theory
of MCS "goes against one of the tenants of immunology, that if a substance acts as an
allergen, a specific antigen-antibody ('lock and key') relationship develops. The body will
only recognize the precise antigen or one with the same chemical 'key' within its structure."
Sandier, supra note 63, at 53.
69. Kurt, supra note 64, at 101 ("At the turn of the century, a similar syndrome was
called neurasthenia, exemplified by Marcel Proust, who was so intolerant of perfumes and
other odors that he lived and wrote as a recluse in his cork-lined Paris apartment.").
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entitled Human Ecology and Susceptibility to the Chemical Environment,70
articulating his theory that "individuals could be adversely affected by
extremely low-level chemical exposures in their environment.,7 ' At first
greeted with extreme skepticism, Randolph's theory later developed a
following that included Dallas thoracic surgeon William Rea. In the mid-
1970s Rea set up a clinic to treat patients with MCS.72 Two common
theories provided the groundwork for studies in MCS. The first was that
the symptoms of MCS arise from an initial "overwhelming assault on the
immune system" by multiple chemical stimuli, causing "crossover
reactions" in response to other chemicals.73 The second was that the
condition is caused by a high-level exposure to a single chemical, so that
afterwards, even at very low levels of exposure, the patient's reaction to
environmental factors is significant.7 4 After sensitization, even minor
exposures to a substance can produce symptoms, and patients may become
sensitive to low doses of substances other than the initiating chemical.7
Magill and Suruda have noted that, "[patients with MCS syndrome can
have severe symptoms that interfere with daily life and work., 76 Symptoms
for MCS, though widely varied, typically manifest themselves in three ways:
in the central nervous system, in "respiratory and mucosal irritation," or in
gastrointestinal pain.77
From the 1960s through the 1980s, MCS specialists used the title
"clinical ecologists" to describe themselves; in the mid-1980s the title
became "environmental medicine specialists., 78 This change in name did
not alter the fact there was no agreed-upon method for diagnosing MCS. 79
Indeed, "The lack of widely accepted, standardized, clinical and
70. John Bower, Are You Chemically Sensitive?, EAST WEST, Mar. 1991, at 22. Randolph
released a later book in 1982, An Alternative Approach to Allergies, that contained detailed
descriptions of case histories and treatments. Id.
71. Sandler, supra note 63, at 53.
72. Kurt, supra note 64, at 101.
73. Id.
74. Sandler, supra note 63, at 53.
75. See id. at 53.
76. Magill & Suruda, supra note 65, at 721.
77. Id.
78. Kurt, supra note 64, at 101.
79. Gail E. McKeown-Eyssen et al., Multiple Chemical Sensitivity: Discriminant Validity of
Case Definitions, 56 ARCHiv\ES EN~rrL. HEALTH 406, 406 (2001) ("The variety of symptoms
reported, the lack of consistency in physical findings or laboratory test results-together
with the variability of substances that reportedly provoke symptoms-make it difficult for
investigators to formulate a case definition of MCS.").
IV:l1 (2004)
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epidemiologic criteria for [MCS] syndrome has led to confusion about the
identification of the condition and slowed pertinent research.""" As with
fibromyalgia, the syndrome suffered a credibility defect because it had
been linked to various psychological conditions, including anxiety
disorders and agoraphobia,"' leading some to dismiss it as "a haven for
quacks and neurotics."'82 This perception was exacerbated by the fact that
in an attempt to avoid symptoms, "[p]atients often significantly alter their
behavior in an attempt to avoid presumed precipitants of symptoms. They
may have withdrawn from activities, friends and family in an attempt to
eliminate chemical exposures."83 In 1989, eighty-nine top clinicians and
researchers of MCS, despite having diverse views of the condition,
developed consensus criteria for the definition of MCS. The five criteria
"defin[ed] MCS as [1] a chronic condition [2] with symptoms that recur
reproducibly [3] in response to low levels of exposure [4] to multiple
unrelated chemicals and [5] improve or resolve when incitants are
removed."84
80. DJ. Kutsogiannis & Ann L. Davidoff, A Multiple Center Study of Multiple Chemical
Sensitivity Syndrome, ARCHIVES ENVTL. HEALTH, May 2001, at 196.
81. Thomas Kurt has noted, "Case series studies performed by investigators evaluating
MCS patients have consistently shown neuropsychiatric problems that have included
depression, somatization disorders, anxiety/panic disorder often with agoraphobia, history
of recent major changes in life events, history of physical or sexual abuse and history or
[sic] addictive disorders." Kurt, supra note 64, at 102.
82. Chapman, supra note 66, at 592. But see Magill & Suruda, supra note 65, at 721 (" [I] t
is unclear if a causal relationship or merely an association exists between MCS and
psychiatric problems.").
83. Id. at 723. Magill and Suruda report:
In one study of 35 patients with occupationally related MCS ... 97 percent of the
patients had stopped activities outside the home, 91 percent had limited their
travel, 89 percent had limited their contact with friends and 77 percent had left a
job. Many changed home routines: 97 percent had stopped using cleaning
compounds ... 94 percent stopped using fragrances, 91 percent changed their
diet and 86 percent changed the type of clothing they wore.
Id. (internal citation omitted). For one example of an individual who took the life changes
to an extreme, see Karen Abbott, Is It Medical or Mental? Sufferers of Multiple Chemical
Sensitivities Puzzle Doctors, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, February 24, 1994, at 2A (relating the
story of Nancy Ward, who lives in "Supercan," a silver trailer outfitted in only natural
materials to prevent chemical exposure). Nancy Ward is not the only MCS sufferer who has
isolated herself in an attempt to prevent chemical exposure. Herman Staudenmayer, a
psychologist who treats MCS sufferers, has noted, "'[Individuals with MCS] will isolate
themselves, either in their homes, or they live in the mountains, they live in the desert, they
live in porcelain-lined trailers and, in the most extreme cases, in some kind of bubble
environment." Id.
84. Multiple Chemical Sensitivity: A 1999 Consensus, 54 ARCHIVES ENvTL. HEALTH 147, 147
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Another problem arose from the actual research done by clinical
ecologists. Patients are tested for MCS by undergoing exposure to a variety
of substances; patients then report any symptoms to their physician. These
tests were condemned by organizations like the American Medical
Association because they were "rarely blind" and were "wholly...
subjective. '"' In one of the few double-blind studies, when twenty MCS
patients were subjected to doses of either clean air or chemicals, none of
the patients could accurately determine if they had been exposed to the
chemicals.86
Study of the condition got a major boost around the same time from
an unexpected source-the returning Gulf War veterans. Before Desert
Storm the vast majority of patients with MCS were women, and the
condition was often linked to hysteria, but by 1993, several thousand Gulf
War veterans-generally previously-healthy males-reported mysterious
ailments that may be linked to exposure to biological and chemical warfare
agents, as well as petrochemicals from Kuwaiti oil fires."' Many believed
they had MCS. In 1994, in a radical position change, the American Medical
Association acknowledged that MCS was not solely a psychological
disorder, but maintained that further research was required before MCS
could be defined as a clinical entity; several federal agencies, including the
U.S. Department of Environmental Protection and the U.S. Consumer
Product Safety Administration, concurred.88 The U.S. Department of
Veterans Affairs (VA), hoping to avoid a debacle similar to the one over
the use of Agent Orange in Vietnam, agreed to study the illness. Congress
appropriated five million dollars over ten years for studies by the National
Academy of Sciences. 9 Still, a comprehensive approach was lacking,9 and
by 1998, the studies were still not complete. One study that involved more
(1999) [hereinafter A 1999 Consensus].
85. Chapman, supra note 66, at 592.
86. Id.
87. See Usha Lee McFarling, Military Launches Assault on Mysterious Gulf War Ailments,
THE BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 14, 1994, at 25.
88. Thomas D. Williams, Studies of Gulf War Vets'Illnesses Continue, THE HARTFORD
COuRANT, Oct. 31, 1998, at A7.
89. John Ritter, Ailing Gulf Vets Ask Why/ Unexplained Illnesses Stump the VA, USA TODAY,
Nov. 11, 1993, at 1A [hereinafter Ritter, Unexplained Illness]. Veterans still had long waits for
exams-many for months-and few were sent to special referral centers; the detoxification
unit for MCS was still waiting for more funding in December of 1993. John Ritter, Ailing
Veterans vs. the VA/ "No Budget" for Gulf War Treatments, USA TODAY, Dec. 14, 1993, at 2A
[hereinafter Ritter, No Budget].
90. Ritter, No Budget, supra note 89, at 2A.
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than 20,000 servicemen-split between those who served in the war and
those who did not-indicated that 14.5 percent of Gulf War veterans
reported signs of severe MCS, while only 4.5 percent of those who did not
serve abroad had symptoms consistent with MCS."'
Despite the sluggishness of the military's response, MCS began to have
an impact in other areas. Though it had no clear clinical definition, many
believed that MCS was emerging as a major medical problem, and some
doctors began to accept that patients were experiencing real physical
symptoms, even if there was no clear diagnosis for their problem.2
Between fifteen and thirty percent of the U.S. population may suffer from
MCS; five percent may have the particularly severe reactions that make
MCS disabling.93 Several federal agencies, including the U.S. Department
of Social Security94 and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), identify MCS as a disabling medical condition. 95
In 1999, a decade after the first consensus criteria were released, a
group of clinicians released a sixth criterion: that the symptoms occur in
multiple organ systems. The six criteria were commonly included in MCS
studies, but the consensus report emphasized that standardized use in
clinical settings was "still lacking, long overdue, and greatly needed."96
Research by state and federal agencies has shown that while MCS is a
commonly diagnosed chronic disorder in civilians, it is more common still
among American Gulf War Veterans."7 Nonetheless, the condition remains
highly controversial, in part because of the lack of standardization that
91. Williams, supra note 88. Another survey of approximately 1,100 Gulf War veterans,
undertaken in 1995 and released in 1999, was based on responses to questionnaires, and it
showed similar results. Slightly over thirteen percent of respondents qualified for a
diagnosis of MCS, and there were no appreciable effects of gender, race, duty status (active
or reserve) or rank, though MCS was slightly more prevalent in women and African
Americans. Howard M. Kipen et al., Prevalence of Chronic Fatigue and Chemical Sensitivities in
Gulf Registry Veterans, 54 ARCHIvES ENVTrL. HEALTH 313 (1999).
92. Valerie Ulene, A Sensitive Question, L.A. TIMES, May 5, 2003, at 4.
93. Molly Ivins, Allergies: The Rodney Dangerfield of Disease, BUFFALO NEWS, Sept. 25, 1998,
at 3d.
94. Chapman, supra note 66, at 592.
95. Michelle Malkin, The Patients are Victimized When Bullies Corrupt Science, SEATTLE
TIMES, Apr. 29, 1997, at B4. HUD recognized in 1989 that people with MCS were disabled
and qualified for assistance under the Affordable Housing Act. Julie Appleby, Environment
Built to Be Bare: In Matin County, A HUD-Backed Haven Is Designed for the Chemically Sensitive,
WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1995, at T08.
96. A 1999 Consensus, supra note 84, at 147.
97. See id.
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infects diagnoses.98 Currently, there are at least four major suggested
etiologies for MCS: physical,9 stress, misdiagnosis,'00 and illness belief. 1"
Much about MCS remains unknown and undefined, and unlike
fibromyalgia, the development of MCS as a diagnosis has met with
resistance from industry, as well as the medical community. Manufacturers
of everything from fragrances to chemical pesticides have billions of
dollars at stake; some doctors suggest that industry public relations efforts
are the only reason MCS research has moved so slowly and remained so
controversial. 02 If this is the case, the anti-MCS movement has certainly
98. Id.
99. Three basic mechanisms fall under the physical etiology: allergy, direct toxic effects,
and neurobiologic sensitization. The allergy theory holds that chemical exposures "cause
the development of allergies to low levels of many chemicals, not just the initiating one;"
the toxicological effects theory proposes that low dose exposure instead acts as poison; the
neurobiologic sensitization theory states that an "affected person develops increasing
neurologic sensitivity to adverse effects of chemicals." Each of these theories has problems:
careful studies comparing patients with MCS and control patients have found no difference
in immunological testing; objective evidence is lacking for the second proposal; and the
third pattern has been documented only in animals, not in humans, and not at the low
doses reported to cause MCS. Magill and Suruda, supra note 65, at 721.
100. A stress etiology has been suggested as an alternative theory of causation because
"about one-half the patients with MCS in various studies meet the criteria for depressive or
anxiety disorders." Many have diagnosed sleep disorders, or meet the criteria for them.
However, as with fibromyalgia, there are difficulties in developing studies that can
effectively separate actual causation from mere incidence. Patients with MCS have higher
rates of sleep-disorders, depression and anxiety than the general public, but it is unclear
whether the conditions cause MCS, are caused by it, are simply associated with it, or
whether perhaps both MCS and the psychiatric conditions result from a common
underlying neurobiological mechanism. The complexity of these interactions is one reason
that the third suggested etiology, misdiagnosis, is often put forward in discussion of MCS.
As under fibromyalgia, there is the suggestion that MCS sufferers may all be suffering from
the same condition that is not MCS-for example, MCS overlaps heavily with chronic
fatigue syndrome-or they may be suffering from several different conditions that present
similar symptoms. Id. at 721.
101. The final etiology, illness belief, is a variant of the "it's all in your head" school of
thought. This theory holds that regardless of the syndrome's physiological, toxic, or
psychiatric origins, there is a culture of belief that attaches to MCS and defines its
mechanisms and manifestations in a patient's mind. This belief is a result of a patient's
interaction with the array of support groups, clinicians, hotlines, lawyers, journalists, media,
and websites that discuss and support MCS. Id. at 721.
102. Ann McCampbell, Multiple Chemical Sensitivities Under Siege, TOWNSEND LETrER FOR
DocTORS & PATIENTS,Jan. 1, 2001, at 20. McCampbell is the head of the MCS Task Force of
New Mexico. She blasts the chemical industry, providing in-depth explanations of the ways
IV:I1 (2004)
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been effective: Even in the most recent material, highly contentious debate
about the condition continues. 103
III. FIBROMYALGIA, MCS, AND THE ADA
The results for fibromyalgia and MCS in the ADA litigation are tied to
the fate of ADA litigation as whole. Ruth Colker's 1999 comprehensive
study of ADA employment litigation refutes the popular perception that
the ADA has been a "windfall for plaintiffs. 10 4 Colker's study found that the
results for plaintiffs in ADA cases are far worse than in other, similar areas
of civil rights law: "[0]nly prisoner rights cases fare as poorly.
10 5
Defendants prevailed in over ninety-three percent of ADA employment
discrimination cases; on appeals by plaintiffs, courts decided eighty-four
percent of the cases in the defendant's favor.'"' Colker found that almost
forty percent of ADA cases were decided through summary judgment;0
7
she argues that courts are too willing in ADA cases to take cases from the
jury and that they set too high a standard of evidence for defeating
defendants' motions for summary judgment. 0
The results in fibromyalgia and MCS litigation not only support
Colker's findings, but paint an even bleaker picture for ADA plaintiffs. The
following findings are based on a complete search of ADA litigation on
Westlaw and on the Eighth Circuit website for all cases involving the ADA
and either "MCS," "fibromyalgia," "fibrositis," or "fibromyositis," with the
hope of creating as complete a picture as possible of how courts have
industry has fought the MCS diagnosis. She reports that, like the tobacco industry, the
chemical industry often uses "non-profit front groups with pleasant sounding names,
neutral-appearing third party spokespeople, and science-for-hire studies to try to convince
others of the safety of their products." Id.
103. For descriptions of the current status of the debate see, for example,Joan Axelrod-
Contrada, Your Health: Are Fragrances Making Some People Sick ?, BOSTON GLOBE, July 8, 2003,
at C3 ("Although some doctors believe that MCS is a legitimate illness, others maintain that
patients really have an undiagnosed allergy or a psychosomatic ailment. The American
Medical Association's Council on Scientific Affairs does not recognize MCS as a clinical
condition."); and Ulene, supra note 92 ("Is multiple chemical sensitivity-extreme reactions
to common compounds-a disorder, as some doctors think, or just fiction, as others say?").
104. Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfallfor Defendants, 34 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 101,103 (1999) (reviewing every appellate decision and many of the
district court cases decided since the ADA became effective in 1992).
105. Id. at 100.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 126.
108. Id. at 160.
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handled the two emerging diagnoses. 0 9 Colker notes that several sources of
bias exist in her study, and those same methodological problems exist
here. Particularly troubling is the high rate of unavailable opinions at both
the trial court and appellate levels. Looking solely at published opinions
may skew the data if published opinions overstate plaintiff success rates. In
traditional employment litigation, for example, data indicate that plaintiffs
are four times more successful in published opinions, as compared to
unpublished ones. ° If a court grants summary judgment, it is more likely
to provide a written opinion than if it grants a motion to dismiss or enters a
directed verdict; thus, as Colker notes, a focus on published opinions may
downplay advantages enjoyed by defendants at the summary dismissal stage
while "overstating the prevalence of summary judgment decisions for
defendants."''. The "problem of unpublished opinions" extends to the
appellate level as well."2 To weed out cases in which the nature of
fibromyalgia or MCS, interacting with the ADA, did not play a decisive role
in the court's decision, cases in which MCS or fibromyalgia were one
among many illnesses/conditions listed (with no substantive discussion of
any of the illnesses), and cases that were decided on procedural grounds
unrelated to the stated ADA claim were excluded. That left forty
fibromyalgia cases and eighteen MCS cases. The earliest cases for both
conditions came in 1995." Because thirty-seven of the thirty-nine
fibromyalgia cases and seventeen of the eighteen MCS cases were
employment cases, the analysis below focuses on Title I employment
109. The following "terms and conditions" searches were used: "fibromyalgia and ADA";
"fibrositis and ADA"; "fibromyositis and ADA"; "(MCS or "multiple chemic! sensitivity!")
and ADA."
110. Colker, supra note 104, at 104.
111. Id.
112. Colker writes:
Since 1972, the Judicial Conference of the United States has taken the position
that United States Courts of Appeals should publish opinions only where a
decision has obvious precedential value .... [E]ach court of appeals has been
allowed to create its own rules on publication, so the circuits lack a uniform
policy on publishing opinions.
Id. The opinions of the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits are not available through any
electronic source. Westlaw selectively publishes the opinions of the Sixth, Ninth, Tenth and
D.C. Circuits; the Sixth and Tenth sometimes send their opinions to Lexis as well. The
Eighth Circuit runs its own Internet site, and the Second has a searchable database for all
unpublished opinions. Id. at 104 & n.30. Colker states that only about forty-two percent of
all appellate affirmances are available to the public. Colker, supra note 104, at 105.
113. Whillock v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 1555 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (MCS); Taylor v.
Albertson's, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 819 (W.D. Okl. 1995) (fibromyalgia).
IV:I1 (2004)
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litigation. "4
A. The Fibromyalgia Cases
Among the fibromyalgia cases, motions for summary judgment by the
defendant on ADA claims were granted or affirmed in thirty-three of the
thirty-seven cases (almost ninety percent); a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim was granted in another case. In only four cases did plaintiffs
survive motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment, and in none
of those cases is a there a later record of the plaintiff prevailing at trial. It is
possible that the cases were settled favorably for the plaintiff out of court,
or are still in litigation, but based on published opinions, fibromyalgia suits
under the ADA appear to be an almost total failure. While these results are
similar to those for other disabilities claimed under the ADA, analysis does
suggest a greater focus on the nature of the disease (i.e., fibromyalgia) in
those cases. Questions about the severity of the illness arise in the
opinions," 5 as do questions about the occasionally intermittent nature of its
symptoms." 6 Interestingly, even in the early cases, no court rejects evidence
about fibromyalgia as an illness, and several explicitly accept fibromyalgia
as a diagnosis, or state that it qualifies as an impairment under the ADA
' 7
114. Almost all of the cases were Title I suits against private employers, though two of the
MCS cases and one of the fibromyaglia cases were Title 11 suits brought against public
entities.
115. Mincey v. Dow Chemical Co., 217 F. Supp. 2d 737, 740 (M.D. La. 2002) (noting
testimony by employee's physician that "he did not consider fibromyalgia to be a serious
health condition"); Holt v. Olmsted Tp. Bd. of Trustees, 43 F. Supp. 2d 812, 823 (N.D.
Ohio 1998) (noting claim by defendant that "aches and pains associated with Fibromyalgia
do not rise to the level of a substantial limitation on a major life activity"); Aquinas v.
Federal Exp. Corp., 940 F. Supp. 73, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that plaintiffs doctor calls
fibromyalgia "very, very annoying").
116. Johns-Davila v. City of New York, No. 99 CIV. 1885, 2000 WL 1725418, at *6-*8
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting plaintiffs claim "that fibromyalgia is a... condition ... sensitive to
atmospheric and environmental changes"); Carter v. General Elec. Co., No. 98-C50239,
2000 WL 321663, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (stating that "GE correctly notes that intermittent,
episodic impairments are not disabilities under the ADA," but "that intermittent
impairment that is a characteristic manifestation of an admitted disability must be
accommodated").
117. Wolz v. Deaton-Kennedy Co., No. 98-C6610, 2001 WL 699096, at 5 (N.D. Il1. 2001)
(noting defendant's acceptance of fibromyalgia as a recognized medical condition); Walker
v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., No. CIV.A.99-748-JJF, 2000 WL 1251906, at *17 (D. Del. 2000)
(stating that plaintiffs alleged fibromyalgia constitutes an "impairment" under the ADA);
Winn v. Runyon, No. 96-C3168, 1998 WL 565231, at *3 n.5 (N.D. Il1. 1998) (stating that
23
Afram: New Diagnoses and the ADA
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2004
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
-even though a number of courts recognize the inherently subjective
nature of a fibromyalgia diagnosis.
1 8
B. The MCS Cases
Among the MCS cases, motions for summary judgment by the
defendant were granted or affirmed in fourteen of seventeen cases (just
over eighty percent). In only one case did a judge rule that the plaintiff
with MCS had enough evidence of a disability to survive a motion for
summary judgment."9 These results are not startlingly different from those
for fibromyalgia, but the cases themselves generate a much richer textual
discussion of the nature of MCS than do the fibromyalgia cases. The
reason for this difference is exemplified by the two cases on MCS that do
not deal with requests for summary judgment, but rather for motions in
limine: Frank v. State of New York'
2" and Treadwell v. Dow-United Technologies.
12
1
C. Daubert and Emerging Diagnoses
The two motions were requests to exclude testimony by the plaintiffs'
MCS experts under the Daubert expert witness standard. The Daubert
standard developed in the mass toxic torts context and arose out of a case
involving charges that the drug Benedictin caused birth defects. 22 The case
raised the issue of the correct standard of reliability for the admission of
expert scientific testimony. The district court had granted summary
judgment to the defendant on the ground that while there was extensive
research to support the defendant's claim that Benedictin did not cause
birth defects, the expert testimony offered by the plaintiffs on the drug's
fibromyalgia is a "clearly identifiable condition"); Skorup v. Modern Door Corp., No. 3:95-
CV-1006RP, 1997 WL 662507, at *7 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (stating that fibromyalgia qualifies as
an impairment under EEOC interpretive regulations).
118. McPhaul v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Madison County, 226 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2000)
("Fibromyalgia is a disease that is similar to chronic fatigue syndrome; its cause is unknown,
there is no cure, and the symptoms are entirely subjective and usually involve chronic pain
and fatigue."); Wolz v. Deaton-Kennedy Co., No. 98-C6610, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8462,
*21-*22 (N.D. Ill. 2001) ("The condition is based entirely on the patient's subjective
complaints.") (emphasis added).
119. Davis v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 96 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (D. Utah 2000). Interestingly,
this is a case in which a diagnosing physician stated in an affidavit that he did not diagnose
the plaintiff with MCS because he did not believe MCS existed.
120. 972 F. Supp. 130 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
121. 970 F. Supp. 974 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
122. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
IV:I1 (2004)
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harmful effects did not meet the required standard of "general
acceptance" in the scientific community. 2 3 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed, citing Fye v. United States,124 which stated that if a
scientific expert testified to a conclusion, "the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.' 25 On appeal to the
United States Supreme Court, the plaintiffs argued that Frye's "general
acceptance" test was superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence and asserted that their experts' opinions should not have been
excluded as unreliable. 26 The Supreme Court agreed that the Rules had
superseded Frye, especially Rule 702, governing expert testimony. At the
time, Rule 702 stated: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise.' 1 7 The Court held that "the austere standard" of
"general acceptance" under Frye was incompatible with the more
permissive language of Rule 702.128 That did not mean, however, that the
Court was willing to open up trials to any and all expert testimony. The
Court stated that under the Rules the trial judge was responsible for
ensuring "that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not
only relevant, but reliable." Scientific evidence and testimony admitted
did not have to be "known to a certainty," but did have to be supported by
"good grounds"'30 based on the scientific method accepted in the
appropriate field: "Rule 702's 'helpfulness' standard requires a valid
scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition of
admissibility."'3'1 The Court recognized that at times there would be tension
between scientific research, which was open to perpetual revision, and the
demands of a trial, which required speed and finality in determinations.
32
The Court was particularly concerned about the impact of allowing
scientific experts to testify to still amorphous theories, because of their
123. 727 F. Supp. 570, 572 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
124. 54 App. D.C. 46 (1923).
125. Id. at 47.
126. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
127. FED. R. EVID. 702, quoted in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.
128. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
129. Id. at 589.
130. Id. at 590.
131. Id. at 591-92.
132. Id. at 590.
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unique ability to offer opinions from the stand based on secondary sources
of knowledge, and because of the weight their opinions often carry:
Unlike an ordinary witness... an expert is permitted wide latitude to
offer opinions, including those that are not based on firsthand knowledge
or observation.... Presumably, this relaxation of the usual requirements
of firsthand knowledge-a rule which represents "a 'most pervasive
manifestation' of the common law insistence upon 'the most reliable
sources of information. . .. "'-is premised on an assumption that the
expert's opinion will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience
of his discipline.
33
According to the Court, the correct response to the tension between
science, reliability, and resolution was guided flexibility for the trial judge.
The Court offered some general observations about factors that would
bear on the inquiry into whether an expert's testimony should be
admitted. The observations developed into a non-dispositive four-prong
test for expert witness reliability: whether theory or technique presented by
the expert (1) can be and has been tested; (2) has been subjected to peer
review and publication; (3) has a known or potential rate of error; and (4)
has attained general acceptance in the pertinent scientific community.
In 1999, in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,35 the Court extended its
ruling in Daubert to the admission of testimony of all expert witnesses, not
just scientific experts. The Kumho Tire case involved the admission of the
testimony of an expert on tire failure analysis. In extending its Daubert
doctrine outside the realm of "hard science," the Court noted that Rule
133. Id. at 592 (citations omitted). There is a strong divergence between English and
American law on the comparative treatment of expert and lay testimony. English courts will
typically allow lay witnesses to present not only facts, but also opinions, based on their
personal knowledge. American courts have been much stricter, and the expert/lay split has
developed from early American courts:
[American courts] operated toward a broader presumption that an "opinion is
not evidence." This was a principle of convenience and efficiency. Since the jury
was to assess credibility and draw rational inferences from the evidence, allowing
a witness to say what inferences she drew from the evidence served no purpose.
By contrast, if a witness had some "special skill" that would help the jury
understand evidence that otherwise would be beyond its competency to interpret,
opinion testimony would be allowed. Eighteenth and nineteenth century
American courts did not establish bright lines on the issue of opinion testimony
by the experts.
John V. Jansonius & Andrew M. Gould, Expert Witnesses in Employment Litigation: The Role of
Reliability in Assessing Admissibility, 50 BAYLOR L. REv. 267, 271 (1998).
134. Id. at 593-94.
135. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
IV:I1 (2004)
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702 made no relevant distinction between "scientific" knowledge and
"technical" or "other specialized" knowledge,' and that it would be
"difficult, if not impossible," for judges to administer a rule that required
them to differentiate between "scientific" and "technical" knowledge."7 It
also noted that, "[t]here is no clear line that divides the one from the
others,""13 and no evident break between the application of scientific
principles and skill-based or experience-based observations. The Court
emphasized, however, that the Daubert inquiry was to be a "flexible one...
not... a definitive checklist or test.' 39 Too much depended on the unique
circumstances of the particular case for the Court to issue an across-the-
board rule for what was and was not admissible, and the type of scientific
evidence used in the Daubert case would clearly not be available in every
field and area in which expert testimony might be helpful to the fact-
finders in a case.140
In the wake of Daubert, however, the flexible, open-ended inquiry the
Supreme Court envisioned became an effective exclusionary tool in the
hands of district court judges: Judges were more likely to scrutinize expert
testimony before trial, and less likely to admit the testimony, in 1998 than
in 1991.141 Daubert and Kumho were expanded to encompass ever-broader
categories of expert evidence, including clinical medical evidence.
In an article on the subject, Jean Eggen argues that courts have
incorrectly applied Daubert to clinical medical evidence, which differs
profoundly from the kind of scientific studies presented in Daubert42
Eggen states that while clinical medical evidence is "fundamentally
136. Id. at 147.
137. Id. at 148.
138. Id. at 148.
139. Id. at 150.
140. Effective December 1, 2000, Rule 702 was amended to incorporate the Daubert and
Kumho Tire doctrines. Rule 702 now allows testimony to be admitted if"(1) the testimony is
based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the
facts of the case." FED. R. EVID. 702. Rule 702 does not codify Daubert, but references its
factors in a Committee footnote. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note § 702.4[2].
141. Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Clinical Medical Evidence of Causation in Toxic Tort Cases: Into
the Crucible of Daubert, 38 Hous. L. REv. 369, 371 n. 11 (2001); see also Lucinda M. Finley,
Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges Are Using Their Evidentiary Screening Role to
Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 335 (1999) (arguing that federal judges, in
exercising their gatekeeping capacity, have created exacting demands for scientific proof
that place a higher burden on plaintiffs than did the previous standard).
142. Eggen, supra note 141, at 373-74.
27
Afram: New Diagnoses and the ADA
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2004
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
scientific, as it is grounded in the discipline of medical science," it is more
in the nature of eyewitness testimony. 14 She describes the process by which
physicians make a diagnosis in a clinical setting:
Several different thought processes contribute to the ultimate diagnostic
decision in an individual case. First, the physician conducts a comparative
analysis of the patient's illness in relation to known patterns of disease.
Second, the physician applies certain diagnostic criteria to the patient to
determine the probability that the diagnosis is one particular illness out
of several.... Third, the physician undertakes a cause-and-effect analysis
to determine if the appearance and progress of the disease in the patient
is or has been consistent with generally known physiological or
pathological information regarding the disease.
44
Based on knowledge of the disease that the physician has developed
through past experience and study, he will assess the patient's symptoms,
come to a conclusion about causation and diagnosis, and testify to those
conclusions at trial.
145
The court's recognition of the validity of this process of diagnosis is
especially important in cases in which a new illness or diagnosis is at the
heart of the case. Eggen points out that while a physician may rely upon
epidemiological or toxicological studies when available, relevant studies on
a new condition may not exist, and time exigencies may press for a
diagnosis. 4, In such a situation, the physician's training and prior
experience with patients who have similar symptoms, not their review of
current research, may be central to making a diagnosis. 14 If courts require
"the physician [to] demonstrate reliance upon valid 'hard scientific
studies"' before they will admit clinical-based evidence at trial, 14 they
create an "inadmissible per se standard that has the effect of excluding most
clinical testimony of causation. 1 49 This exact problem has arisen in the
Fifth Circuit. In Moore v. Ashland Chemical Inc., the Fifth Circuit affirmed a
district court's decision that stated, in essence, that the technique of
differential diagnosis is not sufficiently reliable to form the basis of
testimony by a treating physician without reliance on traditional Daubert
143. Id. at 390-91
144. Id. at 392.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 393.
147. Id. at 393-94.
148. Id. at 373.
149. Id. at 374.
IV: 1 (2004)
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hard science. 5° The district court focused on the reliability and relevancy
of the studies underlying a physician's decision-or lack thereof-rather
than the reliability of the physician's diagnostic process. Eggen points out
that, "[I]n contrast, other courts have applied a different standard to
clinical medical testimony."' 151 She notes that the Fourth Circuit has held
that "properly conducted clinical diagnosis is a reliable basis for such
testimony."'1 52 The split in the circuits underscores the continuing debate
about the correct level of scrutiny courts should apply to expert testimony
about emerging diagnoses and is central to understanding the outcome of
the MCS cases under the ADA.
D. MCS and Daubert
In both Frank v. State of New York1"3 and Treadwell v. Dow-United
Technologies,15 4 trial court judges granted the defendants' motions in limine
to exclude expert testimony about MCS. In Frank, after discussing various
definitions of MCS put forth by the American College of Occupational and
Environmental Medicine and the Federal Judicial Center's Reference
Manual on Scientific Evidence, the trial court judge ruled that testimony
about MCS was inadmissible as a matter of law under Daubert. In Treadwell,
the trial court had already denied the defendant's motion for summary
judgment on an ADA claim15 5 before considering the motion to exclude
testimony by the plaintiff's expert. Defendants argued that the expert, a
doctor, would testify about four separate points that the defense felt should
be excluded under Daubert 1) that the plaintiff suffered from a condition
known as multiple chemical sensitivity, 2) that MCS was recognized as a
legitimate medical condition, 3) that the witness had the necessary
expertise to make the diagnosis, and 4) that the plaintiff had contracted
the condition as a direct and proximate cause of her exposure to a
particular chemical while employed by the defendant.5 6 The trial court
judge, in applying Daubert, used a two-prong analysis: first, did the expert's
testimony fall within the realm of "subjective belief or unsupported
speculation," and second, would the testimony assist the trier of fact in
150. 151 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
151. Eggen, supra note 141, at 402.
152. Id. (discussing Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 262-63 (4th Cir.
1999)).
153. 972 F. Supp. 130 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
154. 970 F. Supp. 974 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
155. Treadwell v. Dow-United Technologies, 970 F. Supp. 962 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
156. Treadwell, 970 F.Supp. 974, 979 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
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understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue?17 The court
adopted the position that "the science of MCS's etiology has not
progressed from the plausible, that is, the hypothetical, to knowledge
capable of assisting a fact-finder, judge or jury.' 5 8 The court thus excluded
the expert testimony on the diagnosis of MCS as well as any testimony
related to clinical ecology. 59 While the plaintiff in Treadwell was allowed to
proceed with her case under the ADA (though with limited evidence)
other plaintiffs have not been so fortunate. In other cases, without the
testimony of expert witnesses on MCS, plaintiffs were unable to prove key
components of their claims, leading to summary judgment for the
defendant.' ° No court that has directly considered a Daubert challenge to
MCS evidence has allowed the expert evidence into the record.'5 ' When a
157. Id. at 980.
158. Id. at 982.
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., Comber v. Prologue, Inc., No. CIV-JFM-99-2637, 2000 WL 1481300, at *4-*5
(D. Md. 2000) ("Were it admissible, evidence of this condition could strengthen
[plaintiffs] claim to be substantially limited in the major life activity of breathing....
Following a host of federal courts, the Court finds that Comber's evidence on 'multiple
chemical sensitivity syndrome' does not meet the Daubert standards of admissibility of
scientific evidence for this case.... Prologue's Motion in Limine to Exclude Any and All
Evidence Related to 'Multiple Chemical Sensitivity Syndrome' is granted. Comber's
internist's evidence would not be admissible at trial and cannot help Comber's case to
survive summary judgment."). In another case, Gabbard v. Linn-Benton Housing Authority, 219
F. Supp. 2d 1130 (D. Or. 2002), the court explicitly noted the difficulties plaintiffs have
confronted in this area:
To the court's knowledge, no district court has ever found a diagnosis of multiple
chemical sensitivity ("MCS") to be sufficiently reliable to pass muster under
Daubert.... Plaintiff Gabbard's "case-by-case" approach, mentioned by some of
these courts, is inapplicable here where the issue is whether or not evidence of
MCS is admissible. Whether or not plaintiffs are "disabled" under the ADA or
the Rehabilitation Act-which must be determined on a case-by-case basis-is not
the focus of the inquiry; whether their treating physicians' diagnoses of MCS is
admissible evidence is. As have all other courts which have considered the issue,
the court finds that such evidence must be excluded.... Because it lacks
reliability, evidence of multiple chemical sensitivity syndrome cannot be used in
support of plaintiffs' cases. Further, a reasonable factfinder could not find that
defendants' use of particular chemicals was the cause of plaintiffs' injuries.
Defendant Linn-Benton Housing Authority's motion in limine to exclude
evidence (# 22) and defendant Oregon Department of Transportation's motion
for summary judgment (# 53) are therefore granted. Because the motions are
dispositive of plaintiffs' cases, these cases are dismissed.
Id. at 1134-35, 1141 (internal citations omitted).
161. SeeGabbard v. Linn-Benton HousingAuth., 219 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1134 (D. Or.
IV:l1 (2004)
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direct challenge has not been raised, some courts have been willing to
accept MCS as an impairment for the purposes of the ADA.'
62
In contrast, the issue of Daubert exclusion has never arisen in a
fibromyalgia ADA case. This absence is notable not only because of
significant parallels in the gaps of knowledge about fibromyalgia and MCS,
but also because Daubert challenges have been used to exclude evidence
about fibromyalgia in other areas of the law. A leading case is Black v. Food
Lion, Inc., a 1999 slip-and-fall trauma case out of the Fifth Circuit."3 In
Black, the court of appeals ruled that a magistrate judge erred in admitting
the plaintiffs diagnosing physician's testimony about the cause of the
plaintiff's fibromyalgia. The court of appeals held that the evidence should
have been excluded because the physician had used clinical evidence to
reach her conclusion; the opinion particularly objected to the lack of
testing, peer review, or known rate of errors for the physician's
methodology.64 Other cases have reached similar conclusions.65
IV. QUESTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS
Despite significant similarities between MCS and fibromyalgia, 66 and
similarly dismal results under the ADA, the use of MCS under the ADA has
generated a much more substantial legal dialogue than fibromyalgia, with
far fewer cases. Courts are more likely to discuss and dissect the nature of
MCS than they are of fibromyalgia, and ultimately, much more likely to
reject its validity as a medical claim. Why?
2002); Coffey v. County of Hennepin, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1086 (D. Minn. 1998) ("The
Court has carefully examined the articles cited by Plaintiff, yet has failed to find an article
or a medical association which opines that the methodology of diagnosing MCS has
progressed to a point that it is scientific knowledge capable of assisting a fact-finder.");
Sanderson v. Int'l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 981, 1001-02 (C.D. Cal. 1996)
(excluding expert testimony on MCS because it does not represent "'scientific knowledge'
under Daubert" and Fed. R. Evid. 702 and noting that it "has discovered no case in which
MCS was recognized as a legitimate medical condition").
162. Owen v. Computer Scis. Corp., No. 97-6272 UEI), 1999 WL 43642 (D.N.J. 1999).
163. 171 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1999).
164. Id. at 313.
165. SeeVargas v. Lee, 317 F.3d 498 (E.D. La. 2003); Gross v. King David Bistro, 83 F.
Supp. 2d 597 (D. Md. 2000).
166. Both have no known etiology; both are diagnosed through a collection of subjective
symptoms; neither can be diagnosed through objective medical evidence; both occur far
more frequently in women than in men; and both have received greater recognition, as well
as increased standardization in diagnostic techniques (though perhaps not at the same
rate) over the past decade.
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One possible explanation stems from the fact that there is a huge
industry at stake in the battle over the legal recognition of MCS.
Chemicals, of all kinds, play a key role in almost every aspect of modern
American life. At the same time, a significant number of Americans now
spend as much as ninety percent of their time in buildings with restricted
ventilation, 67 and are continuously re-exposed to various levels of all sorts
of chemicals. A study suggests that as many as a third of all Americans may
be particularly sensitive to certain chemical odors.' 6 The recognition of a
plaintiff's development of MCS as a legitimate legal claim would place
several large industries at risk of new legal liability. Ann McCampbell, a
doctor who heads the Multiple Chemical Sensitivity Task Force of New
Mexico, makes this argument with particular force, documenting tactics
used by pharmaceutical and chemical industries in their war on MCS in
and out of the courtroom and likening them to those used by the tobacco
industry. 169
Ultimately, the explanation is probably less sinister. While fibromyalgia
is still a somewhat controversial diagnosis within the established field of
rheumatology, environmental medicine as an entire field is still struggling
to establish its place in the medical community. 0 The cases in which
courts have excluded evidence about fibromyalgia have been tort cases in
which causation was the key to determining liability, and there still exists a
relative consensus in the medical community that there is no known cause
for fibromyalgia. 7' Similarly, the wholesale exclusion of evidence about
MCS may reflect the legal community's attunement to medical science's
ongoing, blanket uncertainty about MCS. What echoes throughout the
MCS cases is the Supreme Court's reminder in Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael. "[T]he presence of Daubert's general acceptance factor [does
167. Kelley, supra note 25, at 489.
168. Id. (citing Claudia S. Miller, Chemical Sensitivity: Symptoms, Syndrome or Mechanism for
Disease, 111 TOXICOLOGY 69, 71 (1996)).
169. See McCampbell, supra note 102.
170. Kelley, supra note 25, at 488.
171. Interestingly, while the case law recognizes that there is no consensus about
fibromyalgia's cause, it does not recognize that there is a consensus about how to diagnose
it: Despite the American College of Rheumatology's method for diagnosing fibromyalgia,
that standard is not mentioned in a single ADA case. Instead, the information about
fibromyalgia comes from a wealth of sources, including the Merck Manual, Kocsis v. Multi-
Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876 (6th Cir. 1996); on-line medical dictionaries, Carter v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3875 (N.D. I11. 2000); and magazine articles, Winn v.
Runyon, No. 96-C3168, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13771 (N.D. Ill. 1998). It has not, however,
come from one of the definitive sources in the field.
IV:l1 (2004)
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not] help show that an expert's testimony is reliable where the discipline
itself lacks reliability .... 172
While this explanation relieves the exclusion of MCS of its menacing
air, this exclusion remains deeply problematic, not only for MCS patients,
but also for other patients with emerging diagnoses. If what the MCS case
study exemplifies is that legal thought ultimately reflects medical
acceptance, then the courts have effectively used Daubert to reinstitute the
Frye standard of general acceptance. Alternatively, by tying Daubert
testimony by a practicing physician to a requirement that the testimony be
accompanied by "hard science," the courts have established a new standard
that is equally high. Either may ultimately deny patients with emerging
diagnoses protection under the ADA in exactly the same way the plaintiff
was denied relief in Comber v. Prologue, Inc.1
7 3
If patients cannot present expert testimony about their conditions,
they may be unable to prove facts that are significant for ADA claims. Even
if their condition is ultimately recognized, plaintiffs may be denied relief
for years or even decades while research develops, through defendants'
effective use of the Daubert standard. MCS provides a clear example of this:
There may be millions of Americans who suffer from the condition, but
after at least a decade of intensive research since the Gulf War, an MCS
plaintiff is as unlikely now to have the scientific or medical ammunition to
survive a Daubert challenge as she were when the statute was first passed.
While the use of Daubert to exclude new diagnoses is troubling in cases
involving liability based on diagnosis, it is particularly disturbing in cases
that arise under laws like the ADA, in which diagnosis is not supposed to
be central to a determination of liability. Unlike tort cases, liability under
the ADA is not assigned based on how or why the plaintiffs condition
developed, and liability is not tied to which specific condition afflicts the
plaintiff. Any plaintiff who suffers from any condition that substantially
limits a major life activity can claim protection under the ADA, regardless
of the name for her condition. 174
Once a plaintiff has demonstrated substantial limitation, the analysis
shifts away from 'what' the plaintiff 'has' that qualifies her as disabled to
whether or not she has been treated appropriately in relation to her
disability. The fact that ADA liability is not meant to center around the
172. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999).
173. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
174. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000) ("The term 'disability' means, with respect to
individual-a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual.").
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named condition the plaintiff has, but rather around how the plaintiff is
treated, is emphasized by the second and third ways in which a plaintiff can
claim protection under the ADA. Beyond having an impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity, plaintiffs may sue for ADA violations
if they have a record of having such an impairment or are regarded as
having such an impairment.1 5 In other words, under the ADA, if a plaintiff
can prove that the defendant treated her inappropriately based on the
defendant's belief that the plaintiff had an impairment, it is not necessary
for the plaintiff to actually have an impairment.
It is the ADA's apparently inclusive intent-manifested in both its
legislative history and its language-that makes the use of Daubert
exclusion in ADA cases especially problematic. In tort cases where liability
is assigned based on diagnosis and attendant causation, it makes sense for
courts to be cautious about new diagnoses; under the ADA, it does not.
Analogizing an uncertain new diagnosis to misdiagnosis helps clarify why
the exclusion of new or uncertain diagnoses is problematic. Consider the
example of a person suing under the ADA who has been misdiagnosed
with one "established" illness and is then re-diagnosed with another
established illness. In a case where a plaintiff has been diagnosed with
established condition X, and has been given protection under the ADA, it
would make no sense for the court to later revoke protection if the plaintiff
actually turned out to have established condition Y. Presumably, the
plaintiff still has all the same limitations; she has just been given the wrong
name for her condition. This example underscores that the condition's
name, ultimately, should not matter in determining whether or not the
plaintiff is protected under the ADA, because the plaintiff is equally
limited whether she is told she has condition X or condition Y. Similarly, a
plaintiff may have an emerging illness that doctors have difficulty
diagnosing or naming, and yet the plaintiff may quite clearly be
substantially limited in a major life activity, regardless of what name
doctors eventually give her condition. The focus of litigation under the
ADA should be on the phrase "substantially limited" and should look at a
plaintiff's experience with the condition, not on the accuracy with which
doctors can name the condition.
One solution to this problem, consonant with the original intent of the
ADA, is suggested by language in some cases. In Owen v. Computer Sciences
176Corp., a defendant attempted to argue that MCS did not constitute a
175. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2)(B)-(C) (2000).
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disability under the ADA.17 In support of the argument that MCS was not a
legitimate medical condition upon which a plaintiff could base a claim, the
defendant highlighted numerous cases in which expert testimony about
MCS had been excluded due to lack of existing scientific evidence on the
diagnosis. The court chided the defendant:
The determination of whether an individual has a disability is not
necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the person's impairment,
but rather on the effect of that impairment on the life of the
individual.... The appropriate question before this Court is not whether
[MCS] constitutes a per se disability under the ADA, as defendants argue,




The court reminded the defendant that-at least on this issue-the
focus should not be on the technicalities of the ADA. Rather, the court
would focus on the nature of the individual who claims protection under
the statute's auspices and on that individual's story. This normative vision
of the ADA, in combination with other features of the legal system, can
guide courts out of the jaws of Daubert when cases involving new diagnoses
arise.
In other cases, courts have indicated that the testimony of a plaintiff
may be enough to establish the nature and severity of her condition for the
purposes of the ADA.7 9 Federal Rule of Evidence 701 allows lay witness
testimony. Under Rule 701,80 plaintiffs in ADA cases, because of their
firsthand knowledge of their conditions, may offer opinions on matters
normally "appropriate for expert testimony,"'" so that even if expert
177. Id. at *4.
178. Id. at *4-*5.
179. Wolz v. Deaton-Kennedy Co., No. 98-C6610, 2001 WL 699096, at *7 (N.D. Ill. 2001)
("[A]ll Wolz has is her testimony, but that is the very nature of fibromyalgia. The condition
is based entirely on the patient's subjective complaints. Wolz does not have much, but she
has enough to survive a motion for summary judgment.")
180. Federal Rule of Evidence 701 reads:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of
opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a)
rationally based on the perception of the witness, and (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue,
and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within
the scope of Rule 702.
FED. R. EVID. 701.
181. Holt v. Olmsted Tp. Bd. of Trustees, 43 F. Supp. 2d 812, 819 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
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testimony about a condition is excluded, a plaintiff can provide enough
evidence of substantial limitation to shift adjudication forward to other
components of the ADA. In Holt v. Olmsted Township Board of Trustees, the
plaintiff was a woman who had been living with fibromyalgia for six years.
The defendants filed a motion to strike a portion of her affidavit, in which
she discussed her physical condition, as impermissible lay opinion. The
court disagreed: "Plaintiff has personal knowledge of her condition and its
symptoms. Testimony concerning her physical condition is also central to
the factual issues in the instant matter [the ADA suit]. Therefore, those
portions of the Affidavit in which Holt describes her physical condition...
will not be stricken." 182 The court believed that Holt was qualified to testify
about the limitations on her life that resulted from her illness, and was
willing to accept the testimony as adequate to fulfill statutory
requirements.
Blending the opinions in Owen and Holt provides a general guide to
enable courts to allow the ADA to expand to accommodate new conditions
and diagnoses, perhaps even before they have a name. If courts use a
normative vision of the ADA that focuses on individual experience, as the
law itself does, courts can admit plaintiffs' testimony about the nature of
their conditions-and do so consistent with the Federal Rules of Evidence,
even when experts are not allowed to testify about roughly the same topic.
The only court to specifically consider the lay/expert split in a case
involving MCS did just this: it admitted the lay testimony while excluding
expert testimony on the same subject. 183 If other courts were to follow suit,
it would allow even plaintiffs who cannot give their pain a name to give it
the voice to which it is legally entitled.
CONCLUSION
Forty-three million is a large number, a number meant to impress
onlookers with a sense of the enormity of the problem it represents. And
yet, when it comes to the ADA, "43,000,000" has proven surprisingly
restrictive. In a number of cases, the Supreme Court has used the number
as a ceiling on the statute, rather than the floor that was intended; other
courts have jealously policed the boundaries.
For illnesses discovered or developed after the passage of the ADA, the
182. Id.
183. Coffey v. County of Hennepin, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1091 (D. Minn. 1998) ("The
Court excludes any expert testimony regarding Multiple Chemical Sensitivities. However,
lay witness testimony regarding the same will be considered.").
IV:I1 (2004)
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central question is whether they have been offered even the limited degree
of protection the courts have extended to conditions that were well
established in 1991. Several studies, including this one, suggest that they
have not.114 ADA claims brought by plaintiffs with both illnesses are
dismissed at a higher rate than ADA cases as a whole. The courts have also
effectively used the Daubert doctrine to exclude evidence of MCS, a new
and controversial diagnosis. The logic applied in those cases could easily
be applied to other developing diagnoses. The unwillingness of courts to
admit evidence seems much more closely aligned with the rejected Frye
standard than with the- more permissive standard envisioned by the
Supreme Court in Daubert. Even under existing law, however, if courts
remain focused on the individual nature of adjudication under the ADA,
and let ADA plaintiffs tell their stories, there is no reason that pains
without a name should have any less of a chance in court than established
conditions. All Americans with disabilities, be those disabilities named or
not, should be given the chance to prove that they are one of the millions
of disabled Americans that the ADA was enacted to protect.
184. See studies cited supra note 25.
37
Afram: New Diagnoses and the ADA
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2004
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS IV:1 (2004)
38
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 4 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol4/iss1/4
